When engaged in a dialogue it is important that each participant attempts to converge on the common understanding of the topic under discussion. That is: attempt to “meet people where they are” (so to speak). In the exchange between Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson, I feel that Jordan was able to move towards Sam somewhat more than Sam attempted to move towards Jordan. Sam seemed to take the stance that while he, Sam was speaking sense (and he was!), Jordan was speaking utter nonsense at times. Now even if your interlocuter does indeed seem to be spouting nonsense, it’s important to really take seriously the notion that there just might be something there that you’re missing. I know I had to do this when I first listened to Jordan speak. It took time to see: well there’s something there but it's beneath the surface of the literal words in a way. I’m not sure I agree with the message - but I think, at least, I understand it. Jordan is attempting to convey truth not easily articulated. And on the matter of truth he is simply trying to speak about truth not yet captured by language. To be precise I think what he is trying to do is to speak about inexplicit knowledge. To make the inexplicit explicit is a real problem. A contradiction of sorts. But: problems are soluble. And inexplicit knowledge need not always remain so.
A quick note: What is inexplicit knowledge? Consider riding a bike. Presume you know how to ride a bike. You can explain how to ride a bike to someone else. But only imperfectly. What you say to them captures something of the explicit knowledge you have: you can say: pedal and balance and be sure to avoid that tree. But the person is by no means guaranteed to now understand (to have learned) how to ride a bike. All that stuff that they need to actually know: that's inexplicit. How to balance exactly and at what rate to pedal and so on. So this is the difference: explicit knowledge can be put into words. Inexplicit knowledge cannot. Both may contain truth - but some can be articulated while some cannot be. Yet.
Now, I just wish to restate that in my view, Sam did not take seriously the more metaphorical way that Jordan was speaking while Jordan did his best, much of the time, to use the clear literal language Sam was using. Jordan speaks in a more metaphorical way when speaking about moral truth this because he is trying to articulate the inexplicit knowledge instantiated in some religious traditions that conveys objective moral truth. This distinction between explicit and inexplicit knowledge is central to their disagreement. Unfortunately they are both confused about this distinction and its significance. They both need to (re)read “The Beginning of Infinity” by David Deutsch.
Let me personally state a bias: it is eminently preferable for us to speak as clearly, literally and plainly whenever engaged in any kind of discussion. Metaphor is almost always terribly misleading in the final analysis. I am a realist in the Popperian mould and so I have little time for sophistry or obscurantism: charges that Sam might make (and at times validly) against Jordan. Though Jordan is not being deliberately obscure - he is just struggling to convey inexplicit knowledge and at times seems to fail terribly. Let me also say: I too struggle very much to understand Jordan, while Sam is almost always exceedingly clear. On matters of philosophy I frequently disagree with Sam in technical areas - again, I am a Popperian. Insofar as Sam has read Popper he seems to think (wrongly!) that this philosophy reduces to little more than falsificationism. Again I emphasize: he is quite wrong. Popper’s critical rationalism is a world view: it encompasses all of epistemology and more about creativity and fallibalism and rationality and criticism and freedom and flourishing. But that is by-the-by - I mention it just to illuminate that people can converge on truth at a higher level of description even when their fundamental philosophical principles and knowledge diverge. On epistemology, when pressed, I think Sam is a foundationalist - and on science (largely) an empiricist - both positions I reject - but when it comes to actually sorting many problems in answering the question of “how do we know?” we arrive at similar broad conclusions (we use evidence, reason, coherence, etc).
Let us get to the point. Both Sam and Jordan will agree that science does not “know everything”. There is vast ignorance before us; science is an island of enlightenment surrounded by mystery. Sam, I sense, has the feeling that the sea of ignorance is not literally infinite. He thinks we are “almost there” or something like that. That physics is “close to complete” (indeed Sam has used the phrase “completed science” more than once without, apparent, concern). This betrays a fundamental misconception about both reality and the scientific process. Science is always “just scratching the surface” (to use David Deutsch’s description of our rational attempts to understand reality in “The Beginning of Infinity”). But the surface of what? Well - reality of course. Now I happen to take David Deutsch very seriously: we really are at the beginning of infinity - there is - literally - an infinite ocean of unknown to explore and it will always be so.
So there are genuine mysteries out there. And always will be. But does this mean we start to admit superstitious explanations in to make up for the unknown? Of course not! And should we start to use fluffly language to capture these mysteries? Also no!
Let us invoke two of Wittegenstein’s more useful claims:
“If anything can be said at all it can be said clearly.”
“Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent”.
That second claim admits that there is metaphysical truth: but says we cannot say anything about it because it cannot be captured in words (see the rest of Wittegenstein’s philosophy for this. I happen to disagree!). Many so-called “realists” do indeed take this position. Other people, and Jordan might be one, also admit that there are metaphysical truths not captured by clear language but nonetheless are worth attempting to discuss in a less than clearly literal way.
And so, at the fringes of what is actually known and unknown in the sphere of, say - morality - people struggle to know for example “How should I live?” and “What should I do next?” and much more besides. These questions, though they admit of right and wrong answers, lack the precision of scientific questions let alone accuracy in answers. Different people have different values. But there is a reasonable argument to make that there are things that people should value. So what should people value and how can we know?
Jordan argues that some traits are desirable - some values are desirable. How do we know? Well let us see what succeeds! What survives (hence he calls this idea: Darwinism). Especially in our culture - what makes for success, happiness, prosperity and what allows for progress and more besides. Jordan further argues that what religion contains are archetypes: ideal characters to emulate in the world. Not only religious figures (like Jesus) but other mythical figures like Samson or completely fictional heroes like Superman are desirable precisely because they embody characteristics that people find desirable. In particular, these figures embody features that women find desirable. And women find these characteristics desirable because this is what helps humans as a whole flourish. And all this is good. And what is good is true.
So the idea then becomes that there is a moral “truth” to the desirability of, say, Superman that is independent of other arguments we can rationally make at this point because that truth is inexplicit (Jordan wouldn’t put it this way) - except to in some sense axiomatically begin with the assumptions that strength and honesty are good. Good for us. Good for the world. What helps humans thrive is good. And what’s good is true.
Now I personally think this is not quite right. There is something deeper than this: the good qualities of such characters are good precisely because they allow errors (and therefore evils) to be corrected in the world. And either we desire progress (and life) or stagnation (and death). The former always requires those kind of things that Superman or Jesus (in his best moods) personified. I think we can build our moral theories not from foundations - but like all other theories by conjecture and criticism. So long as we “Do Not Destroy The Means Of Correcting Errors” (David Deutsch’s moral injunction) then we can learn to improve all our theories - even our moral ones.
But Jordan, we must recognise does not know this. Or at least not in so many words. He seems to be struggling to articulate it by another means. He can “see” or “understand” the value at the heart of religious traditions that provide cultures (in terms of Christianity and Judaism, at least) which permit progress that is sustainable to thrive. There can be progress by many routes: but most are not sustainable. Revolution may be progress: but it will be destructive of the very institutions that protect progress and so then progress would be short lived. Progress must occur within the context of cultures that have been proven to work. We can’t easily experiment with culture: a wrong turn and the whole experiment can be undone. We can, of course: incrementally improve culture.
Now here is where I agree with Jordan - though he will not use these words. There is inexplicit knowledge instantiated in cultures. Which is to say: there are reasons that some cultures (including religions) work to ensure the survival of our species, reduce violence and help to ensure that progress is sustainable that we cannot properly or clearly articulate. We know it’s there - we don’t know what it is. It’s like how to swim: how to swim is also not easily written down or spoken - but there is a truth of the matter about how to swim, or else you'll drown. We can say some things explicitly - but that part of the knowledge that we cannot capture in words: that’s inexplicit. Maybe some day we’ll be able to make explicit the inexplicit.
So though I fully understand that Sam does not understand Jordan, I understand why he does not. I can converge with Jordan - because there’s knowledge “there” about why cultures and people succeed and are good but we don’t know all the details about what it is exactly we can only say some things and maybe in a “fuzzy” way. So while Wittgenstein advises us to be “silent” when we do not know - we need not take him as the final word on all things metaphysical. Jordan takes another tac: he attempts to use metaphor and language in an attempt to capture truth not yet made properly explicit, but truth nonetheless even if we don’t yet know it. And those truths are, clearly, not part of science - certainly not known science. So I think the problem here is a failure to distinguish by both Sam and Jordan the centrally important difference between explicit and inexplicit knowledge - and how the inexplicit knowledge instantiated in cultures helps them succeed and the people within them to thrive. Jordan is talking very much about the inexplicit knowledge in religion - the truths that attempt to be captured through story. Sadly, he does not do this as clearly as might be done in a critical, analytically philosophical way. For that, in part at least, see “The Beginning of Infinity” by David Deutsch.
I think the concern over the meaning of the word "truth" is actually a red-herring. It is a consequence, not the cause, of a deeper confusion. Truths exist that we know but cannot articulate. Jordan was trying to put this into words and, in my view Sam failed to appreciate that although of course truth must correspond with reality, it need not necessarily be able to be made explicit. And so therefore, though we know some things, we cannot necessarily put them into words. Jordan was trying. But it's an almost impossible task until we know better.
I think they can both move on.
A quick note: What is inexplicit knowledge? Consider riding a bike. Presume you know how to ride a bike. You can explain how to ride a bike to someone else. But only imperfectly. What you say to them captures something of the explicit knowledge you have: you can say: pedal and balance and be sure to avoid that tree. But the person is by no means guaranteed to now understand (to have learned) how to ride a bike. All that stuff that they need to actually know: that's inexplicit. How to balance exactly and at what rate to pedal and so on. So this is the difference: explicit knowledge can be put into words. Inexplicit knowledge cannot. Both may contain truth - but some can be articulated while some cannot be. Yet.
Now, I just wish to restate that in my view, Sam did not take seriously the more metaphorical way that Jordan was speaking while Jordan did his best, much of the time, to use the clear literal language Sam was using. Jordan speaks in a more metaphorical way when speaking about moral truth this because he is trying to articulate the inexplicit knowledge instantiated in some religious traditions that conveys objective moral truth. This distinction between explicit and inexplicit knowledge is central to their disagreement. Unfortunately they are both confused about this distinction and its significance. They both need to (re)read “The Beginning of Infinity” by David Deutsch.
Let me personally state a bias: it is eminently preferable for us to speak as clearly, literally and plainly whenever engaged in any kind of discussion. Metaphor is almost always terribly misleading in the final analysis. I am a realist in the Popperian mould and so I have little time for sophistry or obscurantism: charges that Sam might make (and at times validly) against Jordan. Though Jordan is not being deliberately obscure - he is just struggling to convey inexplicit knowledge and at times seems to fail terribly. Let me also say: I too struggle very much to understand Jordan, while Sam is almost always exceedingly clear. On matters of philosophy I frequently disagree with Sam in technical areas - again, I am a Popperian. Insofar as Sam has read Popper he seems to think (wrongly!) that this philosophy reduces to little more than falsificationism. Again I emphasize: he is quite wrong. Popper’s critical rationalism is a world view: it encompasses all of epistemology and more about creativity and fallibalism and rationality and criticism and freedom and flourishing. But that is by-the-by - I mention it just to illuminate that people can converge on truth at a higher level of description even when their fundamental philosophical principles and knowledge diverge. On epistemology, when pressed, I think Sam is a foundationalist - and on science (largely) an empiricist - both positions I reject - but when it comes to actually sorting many problems in answering the question of “how do we know?” we arrive at similar broad conclusions (we use evidence, reason, coherence, etc).
Let us get to the point. Both Sam and Jordan will agree that science does not “know everything”. There is vast ignorance before us; science is an island of enlightenment surrounded by mystery. Sam, I sense, has the feeling that the sea of ignorance is not literally infinite. He thinks we are “almost there” or something like that. That physics is “close to complete” (indeed Sam has used the phrase “completed science” more than once without, apparent, concern). This betrays a fundamental misconception about both reality and the scientific process. Science is always “just scratching the surface” (to use David Deutsch’s description of our rational attempts to understand reality in “The Beginning of Infinity”). But the surface of what? Well - reality of course. Now I happen to take David Deutsch very seriously: we really are at the beginning of infinity - there is - literally - an infinite ocean of unknown to explore and it will always be so.
So there are genuine mysteries out there. And always will be. But does this mean we start to admit superstitious explanations in to make up for the unknown? Of course not! And should we start to use fluffly language to capture these mysteries? Also no!
Let us invoke two of Wittegenstein’s more useful claims:
“If anything can be said at all it can be said clearly.”
“Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent”.
That second claim admits that there is metaphysical truth: but says we cannot say anything about it because it cannot be captured in words (see the rest of Wittegenstein’s philosophy for this. I happen to disagree!). Many so-called “realists” do indeed take this position. Other people, and Jordan might be one, also admit that there are metaphysical truths not captured by clear language but nonetheless are worth attempting to discuss in a less than clearly literal way.
And so, at the fringes of what is actually known and unknown in the sphere of, say - morality - people struggle to know for example “How should I live?” and “What should I do next?” and much more besides. These questions, though they admit of right and wrong answers, lack the precision of scientific questions let alone accuracy in answers. Different people have different values. But there is a reasonable argument to make that there are things that people should value. So what should people value and how can we know?
Jordan argues that some traits are desirable - some values are desirable. How do we know? Well let us see what succeeds! What survives (hence he calls this idea: Darwinism). Especially in our culture - what makes for success, happiness, prosperity and what allows for progress and more besides. Jordan further argues that what religion contains are archetypes: ideal characters to emulate in the world. Not only religious figures (like Jesus) but other mythical figures like Samson or completely fictional heroes like Superman are desirable precisely because they embody characteristics that people find desirable. In particular, these figures embody features that women find desirable. And women find these characteristics desirable because this is what helps humans as a whole flourish. And all this is good. And what is good is true.
So the idea then becomes that there is a moral “truth” to the desirability of, say, Superman that is independent of other arguments we can rationally make at this point because that truth is inexplicit (Jordan wouldn’t put it this way) - except to in some sense axiomatically begin with the assumptions that strength and honesty are good. Good for us. Good for the world. What helps humans thrive is good. And what’s good is true.
Now I personally think this is not quite right. There is something deeper than this: the good qualities of such characters are good precisely because they allow errors (and therefore evils) to be corrected in the world. And either we desire progress (and life) or stagnation (and death). The former always requires those kind of things that Superman or Jesus (in his best moods) personified. I think we can build our moral theories not from foundations - but like all other theories by conjecture and criticism. So long as we “Do Not Destroy The Means Of Correcting Errors” (David Deutsch’s moral injunction) then we can learn to improve all our theories - even our moral ones.
But Jordan, we must recognise does not know this. Or at least not in so many words. He seems to be struggling to articulate it by another means. He can “see” or “understand” the value at the heart of religious traditions that provide cultures (in terms of Christianity and Judaism, at least) which permit progress that is sustainable to thrive. There can be progress by many routes: but most are not sustainable. Revolution may be progress: but it will be destructive of the very institutions that protect progress and so then progress would be short lived. Progress must occur within the context of cultures that have been proven to work. We can’t easily experiment with culture: a wrong turn and the whole experiment can be undone. We can, of course: incrementally improve culture.
Now here is where I agree with Jordan - though he will not use these words. There is inexplicit knowledge instantiated in cultures. Which is to say: there are reasons that some cultures (including religions) work to ensure the survival of our species, reduce violence and help to ensure that progress is sustainable that we cannot properly or clearly articulate. We know it’s there - we don’t know what it is. It’s like how to swim: how to swim is also not easily written down or spoken - but there is a truth of the matter about how to swim, or else you'll drown. We can say some things explicitly - but that part of the knowledge that we cannot capture in words: that’s inexplicit. Maybe some day we’ll be able to make explicit the inexplicit.
So though I fully understand that Sam does not understand Jordan, I understand why he does not. I can converge with Jordan - because there’s knowledge “there” about why cultures and people succeed and are good but we don’t know all the details about what it is exactly we can only say some things and maybe in a “fuzzy” way. So while Wittgenstein advises us to be “silent” when we do not know - we need not take him as the final word on all things metaphysical. Jordan takes another tac: he attempts to use metaphor and language in an attempt to capture truth not yet made properly explicit, but truth nonetheless even if we don’t yet know it. And those truths are, clearly, not part of science - certainly not known science. So I think the problem here is a failure to distinguish by both Sam and Jordan the centrally important difference between explicit and inexplicit knowledge - and how the inexplicit knowledge instantiated in cultures helps them succeed and the people within them to thrive. Jordan is talking very much about the inexplicit knowledge in religion - the truths that attempt to be captured through story. Sadly, he does not do this as clearly as might be done in a critical, analytically philosophical way. For that, in part at least, see “The Beginning of Infinity” by David Deutsch.
I think the concern over the meaning of the word "truth" is actually a red-herring. It is a consequence, not the cause, of a deeper confusion. Truths exist that we know but cannot articulate. Jordan was trying to put this into words and, in my view Sam failed to appreciate that although of course truth must correspond with reality, it need not necessarily be able to be made explicit. And so therefore, though we know some things, we cannot necessarily put them into words. Jordan was trying. But it's an almost impossible task until we know better.
I think they can both move on.